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His, Hers, or Theirs?
Roger Bernhardt
Christine TourSarkissian

A Family Law or a Real Estate Case?
Marriage of Brandes (2015) 239 CA4th 1461 is not technically a real estate case because the major asset fought over in that
dissolution action was an investment advisory business that the husband had founded before marriage, but which had grown
enormously during the marriage. Because investment advising is not a real estate activity, Brandes has been omitted from
traditional coverage in this Reporter. (It was reported in CEB’s Estate Planning and California Probate Reporter; see 37 CEB
Est Plan Rep 69 (Oct. 2015).) But since the opinion has so much to say to lawyers about community and separate property—
real as well as personal—we wanted to devote a column to its implications.
Brandes is a case of first impression in California, with wide implications not for only family law attorneys drafting pre or
postnuptial agreements or litigating about community and/or separate business interests, but also for real estate attorneys
structuring deals for their clients. As far as we know, no state court had ever before adopted a “hybrid” approach to the
application of two major but contrasting family law doctrines, as happened here.
The Marriage and the Business
Charles Brandes founded BIP, a business of selling investment advice to clients, in 1974. At first, BIP was only marginally
successful. When Charles and Linda met in 1983, BIP was managing $8.2 million in assets and Charles’s annual income was
$44,148. When they married in 1986, BIP’s managed assets had increased to $20 million. When their marriage ended 18
years later, in 2004, the business was managing assets worth $85 billion. (This was in addition to other community property
they had, worth $208 million, as well as $100 million of separate property held by Linda, none of which was involved in this
appeal.)
The business growth from $8 million to $20 million in the premarital period clearly all belonged to Charles, having arisen
before the marriage, but how much of the growth from $20 million to $85 billion was also his separate property, rather than
his and Linda’s community property? The trial court attributed the increase between 1986 and 1992 (from $20 million to
$213 million) to Charles’s efforts, but found that after 1991 (1992 to 2004), factors other than those personal efforts were
more important.
For the first marital period (1986 to 1992), Charles was sole manager, responsible for BIP’s investing philosophy; his track
record attracted investors and he had a handson approach to the business. Based on that, the trial court allowed him a
reasonable return on his initial separate property investment and treated the rest of the growth during that period as
community property income resulting from his efforts, following a calculation known as the Pereira formula (see Peirera v
Pereira (1909) 156 C 1), typically applied when the profits from an activity or asset are derived from the community efforts
expended on it.
The logic of this formula is that in California, because it is a community property state, all income received by the family
during a marriage is regarded as community property. But wealth brought into the marriage by either spouse remains the
separate property of that spouse, not losing its original character because of the marriage. Fam C §770(a). California then
treats the income subsequently produced by that separate property as itself separate property, even though it was earned
during the marriage, unlike some other community property states that characterize rents and profits from separate property as
community rather than separate property. California is also to be distinguished from noncommunity property common law

jurisdictions, which can treat all property as marital property even when it belonged entirely to one of the spouses before
marriage, then dividing it accordingly.
Allocating Income Between a Spouse and the Community
This California combination of rules presents a problem when part of the income from a separate property asset arose because
of the personal efforts of that spouse in managing the asset during the marriage (rather than the passive generation of income
from the asset itself), which portion should in all fairness be treated as community income rather than as rents and profits from
separate property. The Pereira formula, by first calculating a proper return on the separate property investment (say, 3 percent
per year, like a bond or passive rental income) and then attributing the balance of the income to community efforts of the
spouses in managing the property, permits the court to measure and give the other spouse her fair share of the community
income, even though it arose out of an asset separately owned by the other. The efforts of either spouse are community and
compensable under this formula, whether by him or by her.
This Pereira treatment covered only the first part of the Brandes marriage, from 1986 through 1991. For the remaining years
of the marriage (1992 to 2004), although BIP grew bigger and more successful (from $213 million to $85 billion), its success,
according to the trial court, was chiefly attributable to factors other than Charles’s personal effort. This led to the court’s
employing a different method of estimating—the Van Camp formula (see Van Camp v Van [146] Camp (1921) 53 CA 17)—
an approach said to be applied when the business profits are due to the “character of the separate asset” even though
community effort was “more than minimally involved” (In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 CA4th 842)—a rather
unhelpfulsounding yardstick. Under the Van Camp math, a court, instead of reimbursing the separate property first and
giving the residue to the community, begins by first adequately compensating the community (e.g., seeing that Charles
received a fair salary as would be paid to a property manager for those same efforts). Only after that calculation is the balance
of the growth or income of the property treated as separate and awarded to the spouse who owns it. Although Van Camp may
seem to benefit the community at the expense of the separate property owner, the outcome in real dollars can be dramatically
different.
Pereira and Van Camp typically produce different results. If the business (or the real estate) has not done well, then it may be
better to be the first claimant rather than the second. But if the enterprise was profitable, then the residuary claimant is likely
to do best.–If a housing bubble causes an apartment building to generate $100,000 in net rents as against a separate return on
the original investment of only $1000, that leaves the remaining $99,000 of profit for the community; whereas, if a
reasonable compensation to the community—of, say, $15,000 for services—were to be calculated first, that leaves $85,000 as
the return on capital. Spouses probably cannot plan their activities during marriage so as to come under Pereira rather than
Van Camp (or vice versa), but on divorce their attorneys can estimate the probable outcomes under both theories and then
argue for the one more helpful to the respective clients. If the property value has risen significantly during the marriage (and
mostly independently of efforts), the spouse who owns the asset will most likely argue for the Van Camp formula–because it
awards more to him (without asking how much he deserved this return on investment); whereas the nonowning spouse
would probably prefer Pereira, which gives the greater windfall to the community (regardless of how hard it worked for it). If
the asset’s growth was unimpressive, then the owner may be the one to want Pereira, since he will at least be reimbursed off
the top. (We don’t yet have a theory that works out a ratio between return on separate investment and compensation for
community effort and uses them both in a single formula, thank heavens!)
Choosing between two formulas that produce such different results is not easy.–Nor had our supreme court helped matters by
telling trial courts to “select whichever formula will achieve substantial justice,” as it did in Beam v Bank of America (1971)
6 C3d 12. The formulas apply after the fact, when a divorce is in progress rather than when the business is being operated,
and they do not appear readily receptive to direct agreements made during the marriage. Spouses can, while married,
transmute an asset from separate to community (Fam C §850(b)), but can they also agree that a judge will apply Pereira or
Van Camp to that income if they later do get divorced?
Another complicating factor is that, under either Pereira or Van Camp, family living expenses are charged against
community property income, on the assumption that the spouses would have paid their bills that way rather than from the
separate funds of either. In Brandes, that family expense deduction consumed all of the community income during the second
period, which caused Linda to be the big loser: While she got $3.6 million for the growth during the first period, she received
nothing for the second period because family expenses during that 13year period exceeded the community income.
The New Hybrid in Brandes
What Brandes added to all this complexity was that both the Pereira and Van Camp formulas can be applied to the same

asset: The trial court was upheld in its use of the Pereira formula during the 1986–1991 period and then in switching over to
the Van Camp calculation for 1992–2004, based on the changing nature of Charles’s role in the company. That could
certainly happen in a real estate situation. For example, our markets behaved quite differently before 2005 than after 2008,
and individual efforts (aka community property) played different roles in impacting values at one time rather than the other.
In a bubble, it does not take much effort for values to inflate. So far, at least, under both Pereira and Van Camp, growth is
aggregated rather than dealt with on a yearbyyear basis; imagine the complexity of carrying over and netting out this year’s
losses against last year’s gains.
It would have been easier for the rest of us had Charles’s business had been a community asset throughout.–That would have
made all of its growth community growth and all of its income community income; there would be no separate property
claim. Had either Charles or Linda put separate funds into that community business, their contributions would have been
treated as either (nonreimbursable) gifts or interestfree, nonrecourse loans (Fam C §2640), but such contributions would not
have led to any separate property ownership acquisition in favor of the contributor.
Ironically, community property states enacted many of their rules to protect women, who frequently did not own the assets
managed by their husbands. However, in those states, the preservation of premaritally owned property as separate has often
worked against them. In noncommunity common law jurisdictions, where all property is treated as marital and equitably
apportioned, the spouse who owned a premarital asset loses much of the advantage of that situation—it all may be divided
anyway. Preservation of the concept of separate property in a community property state means that the wealthier spouse can
retain much of what he had before the marriage (and its later rents and profits, in California). If taking [147] an impoverished
mate does not make you any poorer, marrying a wealthy one does not automatically make you any richer.
Although the poorer spouse cannot change many of the above rules, she can take steps to get the assets in question out from
under some of them. She can persuade her fiance to retitle assets into tenancy in common or joint tenancy by conveying
fractional interests to her. She can also persuade him (after the marriage) to transmute his assets from separate to community,
although under those circumstances she will have to comply with all of the rules concerning fiduciary duties inherent in
every marital relationship. Fam C §§721(b), 1100(e). If an asset is recharacterized, its subsequent income may not be subject
to a Pereira or Van Camp accounting. Careless asset handling can also have the same effect—separate property that was too
commingled with community property may have lost its separate character. (Linda also made a commingling claim, based on
the phenomenal growth of the company, but the trial court’s answer was that the growth alone did not alter the nature of the
business, nor did nondistribution of its profits mean that separate and community income were commingled or transmuted.)
The Stock Purchase
Linda’s one claim that did somewhat succeed concerned Charles’s purchase (during the marriage) of the outstanding stock in
his company. He did so pursuant to an option that he had acquired from a partner before the marriage, and which he exercised
during the marriage by signing a promissory note, making a downpayment and thereafter paying the balance of the option
price out of the subsequent earnings of the business. Since his option arose before marriage, it came under the “inception of
title” doctrine, which classified those particular shares–as separate property even though he acquired them during the
marriage.
Relying on Fam C §2581, which provides that property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form is presumed (on
divorce) to be community property, Linda claimed that since those shares had been paid for with funds held in joint bank
accounts, they were presumptively purchased with community funds. The court of appeal rejected that argument, holding
Fam C §2581 inapplicable because a more specific statute, Prob C §5305, controlled and allowed Charles to trace his
separate property contributions into joint accounts to preserve their separateness (and also to show that there were no
community funds then available because of the parties’ highspending lifestyle).
On the other hand, Linda’s argument that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim that the stocks were community property
under the “lender’s intent doctrine,” because they were purchased on credit during the marriage, succeeded. In general, there
is a rebuttable presumption that property acquired on credit during a marriage is community. The presumption applies in the
absence of evidence that the creditor was relying mainly on the purchaser’s separate property. Charles had not shown that
there was a lenderpurchaser relationship between him and the seller of the stocks and thus had not rebutted the community
property presumption. Nor was there any evidence that the seller relied on the value of Charles’s separate property in
extending that credit.
This error led to a remand of the case to determine whether the credit was extended to Charles alone or to both spouses. A
contrary finding on this issue the next time around could well make some part of the stock community rather than separate

property. That would mean that, since this segment of the purchase price was paid solely by Charles (Linda having admitted
that there were no community funds available to pay it), Charles would have a right of reimbursement for those payments,
but would not under the recharacterization of that stock as community property. Fam C §2640.–The community would be
compensated directly for this ownership interest acquired by extending its credit and then also awarded some of the profits
attributed to the community efforts expended by Charles on the separate property stock (under Van Camp or Pereira), and
then Charles would be reimbursed for the separate funds he had contributed to pay the community debt.
Community Investment or Community Effort?
Linda made one other argument that we wish had received more attention from the court of appeal, as it is often used when
dealing with real property assets. Under what is called the “Moore/Marsden” approach in family law (see In re Marriage of
Moore (1980) 28 C3d 366 (Moore) and In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 CA3d 426 (Marsden)), investments of
community property funds in separate property give the community a pro tanto interest in the separate asset. Linda
contended that the community had earned $3.6 million by the end of the first (Pereira) period, which amounted to 80 percent
of the business’s value at that time, and since it had not been distributed, it had therefore been commingled with Charles’s
separate property, giving the community pro tanto ownership of 80 percent of the business.–The court rejected that
argument, saying that it would convert the community’s right to postmarital apportionment (per Pereira or Van Camp) into a
right to transmutation that existed during the marriage (239 CA4th at 1477):
California law does not require apportionment of community efforts devoted to separate property on an ongoing basis, upon
pain of transmuting that separate property into community property. Courts account for community efforts towards separate
property through equitable apportionment after the marriage, not transmutation during the marriage.
But that distinction means we have one rule governing treatment of a separate asset that is improved by community funds—
the community owns a share of it—and another rule governing treatment of a separate asset that is improved by community
efforts—in which case there is an equitable apportionment of its income rather than any transmutation of its ownership.–The
court of appeal said that Linda presented no cogent argument for applying this Moore/Marsden fund [148] investment rule to
investment of community efforts, but it is hard to see a cogent argument for two such different rules for such similar
situations.

CROSSREFERENCES: For discussion of the Pereira and Van Camp approaches to allocating a business interest between
separate and community property, see Business Succession Planning: Strategies for California Estate Planners and Business
Attorneys §20.15 (Cal CEB) and Crossover Issues in Estate Planning and Family Law §3.63 (Cal CEB).
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